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Abstract 
Disorder-specific  cognitive  biases  have  been  observed  in  children  whose  parents  suffer  from         
psychological disorders. Despite those same biases being observed in individuals with insomnia, they 
have yet to be explored as an index of vulnerability in children of parents with insomnia. It was 
hypothesized that potentially vulnerable children would demonstrate cognitive biases to sleep- related 
cues, relative to controls.  Following a  “tired-state  induction,”  a  sleep-related  Emotional Stroop was 
completed by 2 groups: 38 children of parents with insomnia and 51 controls. Children also reported 
their observations about the content of the Stroop words. Results showed an attention bias in children 
whose parents have insomnia, but no interpretive bias. The results are discussed in terms of a 
predispositional vulnerability to insomnia. 
 
It has long been established that individuals with a range  of mental and emotional disorders display 
cognitive biases for stimuli relevant to their condition (for a comprehensive review, see  Mathews & MacLeod, 
2005). Despite these findings, the concept of sleep-related “cognitive biases” has only recently been 
investigated (Ellis, Mitchell, & Hogh, 2007). As such, research using computerized cognitive tasks,  such  as 
the  Emotional Stroop  and Dot-Probe  Task, has provided strong and conclusive support for an attention bias 
in people with insomnia (Jones, MacPhee, Broomfield, Jones, & Espie, 2005; Spiegelhalder, Espie, Nissen, & 
Riemann, 2008;  Taylor, Espie, & White, 003). 
 
One of the questions critical to the potential mechanisms of an attention bias in insomnia concerns the 
role of physiological and psychological characteristics inherent to the condition (Spiegelhalder, Espie, & 
Riemann, 2009). Studies on individuals with delayed sleep phase syn- drome (DSPS)—a disorder 
characterized by a physiological sleep disturbance with a minimal, if nonexistent, psychological 
pathway—have found no attention bias in this group (MacMahon, Broomfield, & Espie, 2006; Marchetti, 
Biello, Broomfield, MacMahon, & Espie, 2006). This absence  of an attention bias  effect  in DSPS  
suggests that  a physiological sleep  disturbance alone  is  insufficient  to elicit  a  response  in terms  of 
biased  information  processing.  This interpretation is further supported by sleep deprivation studies 
showing sleep-related attention bias  remains  stable  when normally sleeping participants are deprived  of 
sleep  for of 36 hr (Sagaspe et al.,  2006). In addition, it has been shown  that polysomnographic 
 
 
 
 parameters  of poor sleep are not correlated with attention bias scores in people with insomnia 
(Spiegelhalder et  al.,  2010). Together, these data suggest that  the  attention  bias  in insomnia  is  
primarily the result of psychological processes related to increased preoccupations about sleep and the  
daytime sleepiness (Espie, 2007). 
 
Insomnia has also  been investigated for interpretive biases,  as another  form of cognitive bias, 
albeit to a much smaller extent. So far, three studies have studied whether people with poor sleep  
are more  likely to interpret ambiguous cues  as sleep-related as opposed  to non- 
sleep-related  (Ellis,  Gardani,  &  Hogh, 2010; Ree &  Harvey, 2006; Ree, Pollitt, &  Harvey,     
2006). Again, the issue of teasing apart the physiological from psychological aspects of the 
insomnia, in relation to an interpretive bias, has been further examined. A study by Ree et al. 
showed an interpretive bias in people with poor sleep after controlling for levels of sleepiness and 
anxiety. In addition, Ree and Harvey  demonstrated that levels of sleeplessness mediated 
the intensity of the interpretive bias. Together,  these studies provide suggestive evidence that     
both the psychological (sleepiness and anxiety) and physiological (sleeplessness) aspects of the 
insomnia contribute to the interpretive bias. 
 
Research  in the area of mental  and emotional disorders has become  increasingly focused toward 
factors  that  make  some more  vulnerable  to mental  health  problems  than others. It 
is  widely  accepted that  many  mental  and  emotional  disorders  have  a  strong  familial  link    
(e.g., depression and bipolar disorder; Garber & Robinson, 1997; Goodman & Tully, 2008). In 
this context, children of parents with these disorders have  been shown  to be vulnerable for 
developing  the disorder  themselves  and  cognitive  bias  tasks  have  been  explored  as  an index of 
this intergenerational vulnerability (Gibb, Benas, Grassia, & McGeary, 2009; Gotlib, 
Traill, Montoya, Joormann, & Chang, 2005; Kujawa et al., 2011; Schneider, Unnewehr, Florin,    
&  Magraf,  2002).  These studies  are largely  conclusive,  although the strength  and direction 
(avoiding vs. attending to the relevant  stimuli) of the attention bias appears to be governed by an  
exposure  to a  salient  state  induction (i.e.,  a  primer  that activates  relevant  negative cognitive  
schemas that  are thought  to lie  dormant) prior to the task (Joormann,  Talbot,  & 
Gotlib, 2007; Mathews, Ridgeway, & Williamson, 1996; Murray, Woolgar, Cooper, & Hipwell, 2001; 
Schneider,  Unnewehr, In-Albon, & Margraf,  2008). In terms of interpretive biases  as an index of 
vulnerability toward other mental and emotional disorders, the evidence is scarce, although one study has 
shown that daughters of depressed mothers were more likely to interpret ambiguous stimuli as more  
negative, following a negative mood induction, than daughters of mothers who had never suffered from 
depression (Dearing & Gotlib, 2009). These combined findings do suggest that this change in the 
processing of disorder-relevant stimuli, as indexed by cognitive biases, may be generalizable across 
emotional and mental conditions and contribute to the mechanism  of an intergenerational vulnerability. 
If this assumption is indeed correct, one could postulate that all disorders that are characterized by 
cognitive biases are likely to be subject to intergenerational vulnerability. With this study, we aimed to 
explore this possibility by investigating cognitive biases in children of parents suffering from insomnia.  
 
 
 Specifically, this study  used a “tired-state induction” in combination with an Emotional Stroop task to 
test the hypothesis that children whose parents have insomnia would demonstrate both attention bias 
and an interpretive bias toward sleep-related cues, relative to children whose parents do not have 
insomnia.  
 
 
METHOD  
 
Recruitment 
 
Recruitment took place at the Glasgow Science Center (UK) over an 8-week period (February– March). 
Information leaflets were available at a recruitment stall for individuals to read and consider participation. 
The first section of the leaflet contained an initial self-screen to ensure parents in each group met the criteria for 
the inclusion of their own and their child’s data. The leaflet explained that potential participants were excluded if 
they, or their partner, had a history of or current sleep disorder other than insomnia or if any of the presenting 
child’s siblings had any sleep disorder. Insomnia was described to potential participants as a current  sleep 
problem in getting to sleep, staying asleep, or waking earlier than they would like to for no apparent  
reason, which was causing distress, occurred at least 3 nights per week and had been present for at least 
6 months—that is, based on Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed. [DSM–IV];  
American  Psychiatric Association,  1994) criteria  for primary  insomnia. Descriptions of the central 
features (taken from the DSM–IV ) of five other sleep disorder types (i.e.,  breathing-related sleep  disorders, 
parasomnias,  restless  legs  syndrome, narcolepsy,  and  circadian  rhythm disorders) were provided if a 
parent  was  unsure  of their or their family’s sleep status. The second section of the leaflet outlined 
exclusion criteria to parents regarding the child taking part in the experiment. These were a reported  
diagnosis of color-blindness, a learning disability, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), or 
dyslexia. In addition, the child had to be between 9 and 12 years of age to be included (the age range was 
chosen to reflect   the previous literature on intergenerational vulnerabilities for mental and emotional 
disorders). Parents were  not asked about  sleep  problems in the child taking part in the experiment.  If 
eligible, and interested, parents were  asked to complete a checklist confirming that they did not meet 
any of the exclusion criteria for themselves or their family. Written informed consent 
was obtained from the parent,  and assent was provided by the child. If a parent  had more   than one 
child, who was eligible and eager to take part, then all the children were allowed to complete the experiment; 
however, data from one child per family was included in the analysis. The choice of which child’s data to 
include, if from the same family, was randomly selected prior to testing. The protocol was approved by the 
University of Glasgow ethics committee. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Participants                                                                                                                         
 
A  total  of 94 parent–child  pairs  were  initially  recruited  to the study.  The  child’s  Stroop             
response data was examined for each participant individually. Errors and outliers (i.e., reaction times  
[RTs]  of < 300 msec  and  > 2,000 msec)  were  excluded  from the  analysis  based on 
recommendations  from previous  Stroop  research  (McNally  et  al.,  1994; Taylor  et  al., 
2003). These exclusions resulted in a loss of five datasets. The final sample was 89 children,   
predominately Caucasian (97.8%), and comprised of 51 (57.3%) girls and 38 boys aged 9 to 
12 years (age, M =  10.3 years, SD = 1.05). In addition, 89 parents (55 women; 61.79%; age, M =  
41.45 years, SD= 4.60) were included in the study. The children were allocated into two groups: 
those with a parent  with a current  episode of DSM–IV-defined insomnia (either from 
the presenting parent or reports regarding a partner  in the household) and a control group with   
no parental history of problems with their own, their partner’s, or any of their other children’s sleep 
(32 girls and 19 boys). The final sample comprised 38 children of parents with insomnia (26 girls; 
68.4%) and 51 children (26 girls; 50.98%) in the control group. In terms of the parents with 
insomnia, 36 of the 38 parents reported that they had insomnia themselves (23 
mothers and 13 fathers) of which 4 parents reported having insomnia and also having a partner    
with insomnia. Two parents reported sleeping normally themselves, but having a partner (both men) 
with insomnia. 
 
Procedure 
 
Children were individually tested; the test took place in an enclosed computer area by a trained psychologist. The 
testing protocol for the children consisted of three consecutive stages: the  tired-state induction, the Emotional 
Stroop task, and the self-report scales. For the tired-state induction phase, children first completed the Stanford 
Sleepiness Scale (SSS; Hoddes, Zarcone, & Dement, 1972) to obtain pre-induction sleepiness scores. Then, a 
series of progressive muscle relaxation, yawning, and breathing exercises  (Matsumoto & Smith, 2001) were 
administered for 10 min, which was followed by a re-rating of the SSS to assess post-induction sleepiness.   
Children were told that they were completing a series  of exercises  to prepare them for the computerized 
experiment. Next, the Emotional Stroop was performed. The latter consisted of a practice trial of 20 words to 
ensure that children could read the words, determine the different colors, and correctly use the response box. 
The main experiment was comprised of 40 target words randomly presented in four colors (red, blue, yellow, 
and green) on screen. During the test, children wore earphones to reduce auditory interference. After the 
Stroop test, children completed an interview about the test itself. For this, they were first asked whether they 
noticed anything about the words and, if so, what? Subsequently, the Sleep Self-Report (SSR; Owens, Maxim, 
Nobile, McGuinn, &  Msall,  2000) was administered.  Finally, children were asked whether they were worried 
about either of their parent’s sleep or their own sleep. 
 
 
 
 
 
 During data collection with the children, parents completed a demographic questionnaire and  the diagnostic 
screening  interview  covering  additional  diagnostic  criteria  for DSM–IV- defined insomnia for themselves and 
their family, to confirm group allocation. Upon completion, children and parents were debriefed together, and 
children were provided with token rewards (novelty stickers) for their participation.  
 
 
Measures 
 
SSS.   The SSS was used to examine the effectiveness of the tired-state induction. The scale contains seven 
statements through which people rate their current level of alertness/sleepiness (e.g., 1 = “feeling : : : wide 
awake” to 7 = “: : : sleep onset soon : : : ”). Scores range from 7 
to 49, with higher scores indicating higher levels of sleepiness.                                                
 
Emotional Stroop—Child version.   As with the original Stroop task, the Emotional Stroop involves asking 
participants to name the color that words appear in on the screen. Unlike the words in the standard Stroop,  
Emotional  Stroop  words  are selected  to be either  neutral  or disorder-related. The words  had been chosen 
based on previous research using an Emotional Stroop to examine a sleep-related attention bias (Taylor et al., 
2003), and the words were piloted  on a class of children aged 9 to 12 to ensure they were age appropriate 
(e.g., night, bedtime, dream, tree, bottle, and jumper). It is thought that mechanisms of selective attention will 
drive the preferential processing of concern-related information (i.e., in the content of the word) in such a way  
that interferes with performance on the color-naming task; thus, individuals will take longer  to respond 
correctly  to disorder-related words. In this case, interference  scores were  used as an index of the attention 
bias, and were calculated by subtracting the mean RT from all the sleep words against the mean RT from all 
the neutral words (i.e., MeanRTSleep - MeanRTNeutral).  In these instances,  higher positive scores indicated 
more interference or a larger attention bias. 
 
SSR.   The SSR was used to control for potential  child sleep  problems in the analysis.   
The SSR is a 33-item questionnaire designed for completion by children aged 7 to 12 years, which assesses 
four domains: (a) difficulty going to bed and falling asleep, (b) sleep duration, (c) night awakenings, and (d) 
daytime sleepiness. Total scores range from 13 to 39, with higher scores indicating more problematic sleep.  The 
reliability of the measure in this sample was acceptable (Cronbach’s alpha= 0.73).                                                                                         
 
Diagnostic screening interview.   The diagnostic screening interview was used to provide additional  
information from participants  in terms of the  presence of insomnia,  particularly when reporting on behalf of 
a family member. Participants were asked a series of 11 questions that elaborated on differentiating the 
symptoms of insomnia from other sleep disorders (e.g.,a self-reported sleep onset latency of 30 min or more 
not due to unpleasant or uncomfortable sensations in the legs, nocturnal awakenings accompanied by gasping for 
breath, or a sustained period of sleeping outside desired times,  despite adequate opportunity). Of the parents 
who initially  self-reported  having  insomnia,  100% still  met  the criteria  for insomnia  from the screening 
interview. In addition, all six parents, who were reported to have insomnia by their partner, still met the  
 
 
 criteria after the screening interview. No participants were excluded or  reallocated to a different group on 
the basis of the screening interview. Parents were finally asked whether they were concerned about the sleep 
of their child that was taking part in the experiment (“yes/no” response format). 
 
Interpretive bias data.   To examine the presence of an interpretive bias, the children were asked, “Did you 
notice anything about the words [presented in the Stroop task]?” If the child said “Yes,”  they were then 
asked, “What  did you notice about the words?” To be classified as a positive interpretive bias response (yes 
vs. no), the child had to respond positively to the first question and state that the words  related to sleep, or a 
derivative term (e.g., bedtime or night time). Where ambiguous answers were provided (e.g., daytime), the 
children were asked to recall the words that related to the category that they had noticed, and this was deemed  
as an interpretive bias if the majority of the words provided by the child were sleep-related words from the 
Stroop. 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
Analysis of the demographic data and the children's reports of their own sleep revealed no differences 
between the children of parents with insomnia (age M = 10.29 + 1.09) and the control group (age M = 
10.32 + 1.03) in age, t(87)=.13, n.s; or gender, χ
2 
(1, N= )= 2.73, n.s. The percentage of parents 
reporting concerns about their child's sleep was higher in the insomnia group (21.1%) compared to 
controls (13.7%) but this difference was insignificant, χ
2
= (1, N= )=.83, n.s. The percentage of children 
reporting worry about their own sleep was comparable with 21.6% for children of parents with insomnia 
and 21.1% in controls, χ
2
= (1, N= )= 0.01, n.s. IN addition, there was no significant difference in terms 
of parents' age between the two groups (mean age of parents with insomnia = 42.16 + 4.87; control 
parents = 41.26 + 4.74, t(87)= −.88, n.s. Finally, mean SSR scores for children with parents with 
insomnia were 19.24 + 3.97 and 20.05 + 4.47 for controls and did not significantly differ, t(87)=.91, n.s 
(see Table 1). 
 
 
 
TABLE 1 
Characteristics and Scores of Participants by Grouping 
 
 
Children of 
Parents 
With Insomniaa Control Groupb 
 
Variable M SD  M SD 
Child’s SSR total score 19.24 3.97  20.05 4.47 
SSS pre-state induction 2.26 1.13  2.08 1.07 
SSS post-state induction 2.92 1.44  2.75 1.25 
Note.    SSR = Sleep Self-Report; SSS =  Stanford Sleepiness Scale. 
a n = 38. b n = 51. 
  
Children’s worries about their parent’s sleep were comparable between groups (9.8% control 
vs. 21.1% children of parents with insomnia), X
2
 (1, N = ) = 2.21, ns, suggesting that any  differences 
between the groups was not a result of current concern over their parents sleep. 
 
Tired-State Induction 
There were no significant between-group differences on the Stanford Sleepiness Scale either pre tired-
state induction t(87)=−0.62, p=n.s;  or post t(87)=−0.78, n.s. To examine the effectiveness of the state 
induction, a repeated measures t-test was used t(87)=6.56, p<.001. This showed that the tired-state 
induction had been effective in both the children of parents with insomnia group t(50)=5.11, p<.001;  
and the control group t(37)=4.08, p<.001. Children in both groups reported being significantly sleepier 
following the state induction, although in terms of actual increases in scores on the SSS, this was small 
(Table I). 
 
Stroop Data 
Control children responded to neutral stimuli within 954.63 + 213.93 milliseconds and sleep-related 
stimuli within 942.36 +194.01 msec whereas children of parents with insomnia responded to neutral 
stimuli within 949.44 + 187.02 msec and sleep-related stimuli within 970.82 + 187.02 milliseconds 
(see Figure 1). A one-way between groups ANCOVA, controlling for child's age, sex, and self-
reported sleep problems (SSR scores), was used to determine whether there were differences in 
interference scores by group (children of parents with insomnia vs. controls). There was a significant 
group difference,  F(1,87)=4.03, p<.05;  with higher interference scores in children of parents with 
insomnia (21.38 + 114.52 msec) than controls (−12.27 + 91.73) although the variance explained was 
small (partial ɳ
2
 =  .05). 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 1   Mean response latencies to neutral and sleep-related words. 
 Children’s Interpretive Bias 
When asked, the majority of children from both groups (92%) reported noticing something about the 
words. When prompted, the children detailed a variety of different word characteristics, including; “They 
were different colours”, “One of them was tree”, “Some of them were about sleep”, and “They were about 
bedtime”. Overall, 68.4% of children of parents with insomnia and 60.8% of the control children reported 
that the words were about sleep. A Group (parental insomnia status) x Rported Sleep Content (yes, no) 
chi-square test did not reach statistical significance, χ
2
 (1, N = ) = 0.55, n.s. 
 
 
DISCUSSION  
 
Despite a growing literature suggesting that (a) attention and interpretive biases can be observed within both clinical and 
non-clinical samples of people with insomnia, and (b) cognitive biases are evident in children of parents with a range of 
other mental and emotional disorders, to date, there have been no studies that have examined whether children of 
parents with insomnia have cognitive biases toward sleep. Based on the assumption that the mechanisms of 
vulnerability, indexed by cognitive biases, may apply in insomnia, we hypothesized that attention to sleep- related 
stimuli and biased interpretation of stimuli as sleep-related would be evident in children of parents with insomnia. To 
test this hypothesis, we used a mixed design, where cognitive biases were assessed following a tired-state induction 
in children with parents with insomnia and controls. Data obtained through the Emotional Stroop confirmed that 
children of parents with insomnia show greater interference effects than controls. The effects in the Stroop task, 
therefore, suggest that an attention bias for sleep exists in children whose parents have insomnia. Based on attention bias 
research in other health conditions, we propose that the attention bias observed in the offspring of insomnia patients is 
a potential index of vulnerability in this group. Although further research is clearly necessary to ascertain the latter 
proposition, the results of   this study are interesting not only because they demonstrate attention bias in children of 
parents with insomnia for the first time, but also because this finding holds the potential for novel preventative 
intervention strategies. For example, it is conceivable that children identified as vulnerable for insomnia, by a 
cognitive bias index, could be given a series of management tools to circumvent the potential transition from acute to 
chronic insomnia. However, it must first be e s t a b l i s h e d , presumably through longitudinal research, whether 
children who demonstrate this attention bias go on to develop insomnia. 
 
In contrast to our findings on attention bias, our hypothesis that children of parents with insomnia would also show 
an interpretive bias was not confirmed. Thus, we found no differences between children of parents with insomnia and 
controls. There are two possible explanations for this finding: The interpretive bias seen in children “at risk” of 
depression (Dearing & Gotlib, 2009) does not transfer within the context of insomnia, or the sleepiness induction 
was not sensitive enough to elicit or detect an interpretive bias. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 This study suggests that cognitive biases might transfer from parent to child. Based on the theory of intergenerational 
transference by Beck (1967), one could postulate that this transfer may be mediated by disordered schemata that 
are developed through observing the signs and symptoms of the disorder in the parent. Although this mechanism of 
transfer is well-documented and plausible in the case of depression, it may not be so apparent in insomnia. For 
example, insomnia may not impact on a parent’s behavior to an extent that would interfere with their functioning 
within the family and, therefore, be evident to their child. A parent’s struggle to  initiate and maintain sleep may 
be confined to a time when their children are already asleep. Therefore, the children may simply not be provided with 
sufficient observations of their parent’s disorder from which to develop these disorder-related schemata. This is an 
interesting point, especially when considering that only a small percentage (21.1%)  of the children of parents with 
insomnia reported being worried about their parent’s sleep, despite 100% of the families in the insomnia group 
having at least one parent who met the DSM–IV diagnosis of insomnia and  10.5% of the families  in the insomnia  
group reporting  both parents  having  insomnia. The main contention to this explanation is that unlike the non-
significant interpretive bias, a significant, albeit small, attention bias was found. Here, an interesting distinction 
emerges that may explain these differences.  Unlike the nighttime symptoms of the insomnia, which may not be 
observable because the child would be asleep,  it is more likely that the child would be exposed to the daytime 
sleepiness and other daytime symptoms experienced by the parent. Going back to the differences between the 
attention biases and interpretive biases observed in the insomnia literature, whereas both sleeplessness and sleepiness 
contribute to an interpretive bias (Ree & Harvey, 2006; Ree et al., 2006), levels of sleeplessness are unrelated to an 
attention   bias (Marchetti et al., 2006;  Sagaspe et al., 2006). As such, it may be that intergenerational cognitive 
biases work in the same way in that, unless children are witness to the actual sleep loss of their parents (i.e., the signs 
of the disorder), there will be no observable interpretive bias. Here, it would have been interesting to do a subgroup  
analysis of the attention and interpretive bias scores based on the amount of time the children spent with a parent  
who had insomnia   compared to the parent that did not (or in 4 cases, both parents with insomnia); however, the 
sample size precluded this level of analysis. 
 
The main  methodological issue  that could explain  the absence of an interpretive  bias  is the  tired-state induction. 
Where previous studies on cognitive vulnerability in children have indicated that the inclusion of a relevant mood 
induction is important (Schneider et al., 2008), this study used a tired-state induction. The tired-state was chosen to 
activate the salient trigger representation of insomnia by mimicking the main reported daytime symptom (i.e., 
sleepiness; Ellis et al., 2007). To create this sleepiness, a set of progressive muscle relaxation, breathing, and yawning 
exercises were used due to their applicability and evidenced use in inducing sleepiness in young adults (Matsumoto & 
Smith,  2001) and reducing  physiological and psychological  arousal  in therapeutic interventions with children 
(Christophersen & Mootweet, 2001). This manipulation appeared to have worked, as demonstrated  by the increased 
scores on the SSS. 
 
That said, the post-induction scores were not outside the “normal” range seen in adult samples; and  the  SSS  has,  to 
our knowledge,  never  been  used  with this  age  group. As  such,  it is difficult  to  ascertain  whether  the scale  was  
valid  in this  sample  and whether  the observed   increases  were, in fact, meaningful (Hoban & Chervin, 2001).  
 
 
 
 However, modest correlations between actigraphically defined sleep and self-reported sleepiness, as measured on a 4-
point scale  ranging from 1 (very  alert) to 4 (very  sleepy), which is broadly similar in structure to the SSS, has 
been demonstrated  in 7- to 11-year-old children (Sadeh, Raviv, & Gruber, 2000). Future research may wish to explore 
the assessment of children’s sleepiness, within the context of cognitive biases, using more objective measures of 
sleepiness, such as the MSLT.  There also remains the broader question of whether increasing sleepiness is the most 
appropriate method to elicit an interpretive bias. As insomnia develops, it may not be that sleepiness is the most 
salient  component of the acute sleep  disturbance. It may  be something else  (e.g., increased sleep  preoccupation  or 
increased  anxiety over the sleep  loss).  To account for this in future research, it may be worth exploring a 
manipulation that not only increased sleepiness, but one that also creates anxiety. That said, it may simply be the case 
that an interpretive bias is not a marker for a vulnerability to insomnia; and, where the tired-state induction activated 
cognitive schemata,  as  evidenced  by the changes in attention bias scores, there is  simply no relation between 
interpretive biases and cognitive schema in insomnia. 
  
This  study should be viewed  in light of its limitations. Primarily,  parents were  asked to self-report on their 
partner’s sleep history, as well as their own. It may be that some parents reported their partner  as never  having had 
an episode of insomnia when, in fact,  they may have; or, they may have reported the partner as not having a current 
episode of insomnia when, in fact,  the partner currently  did. Conversely,  participants may  have reported  their  
partners  as  having  insomnia  when, in fact,  they did not. That  said,  if  it were  the  case that  some individuals 
had been misclassified into the control group, then it would be more likely to skew the results against an observed  
attention bias in the children of parents with insomnia group. In addition, as only two parents with insomnia were 
identified as such  by a normal sleeping partner, the impact of misclassification in these cases would have been small. 
Further, all of the   adult participants went through several screening procedures to ensure group allocation was as 
“pure” as possible. It could also be suggested that  as children with sleep problems were not excluded, the child’s 
own sleep status may explain the observed attention bias. However, the child’s sleep was controlled for in the 
analysis, and there were no between-group differences on SSR scores. In addition, as scores  on the SSR were 
similar in both groups and of a level  normally observed in good-sleeping children (Gregory et al., 2008), it is 
unlikely that this was the case. Finally, the use of the term worried may have created confusion when the children 
were asked to self-report issues with their own and their parents’ sleep. A child may believe their parent to have a 
sleep problem, but not have been worried by this. That said, as the same wording was used with both groups of 
children, any ambiguity would have equally influenced reporting patterns. 
 
Overall, the results demonstrate  that  there was an attention, but not interpretive,  bias  in children whose parents have 
insomnia. Although these findings provide a preliminary indication of a method to assess a potential pre-existing 
vulnerability to insomnia, replication is needed to ensure the validity of the findings.  
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